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RAP AS A PROXY FOR BLACKNESS: HOW THE PROSECUTION 
OF RAP LYRICS CONTINUES TO UNCONSTITUTIONALLY 
RESTRICT FREE SPEECH RIGHTS  
Austin Vining* 
Abstract 
Increasingly, prosecutors have charged rap artists under various true 
threats statutes based solely on the content of their song lyrics despite 
artists’ First Amendment freedom of speech claims. This Article 
examines the progression of the true threats jurisprudence and its 
application to cases involving rap lyrics while also taking a critical look 
at the barriers Black Americans have faced in attempting to exercise their 
constitutionally protected right to free speech. Next, this Article 
contemplates various free speech theories which provide the basis for 
protecting the types of speech often at issue in rap music cases. Finally, 
this Article concludes by suggesting that courts should import the third 
prong of the Miller test, which requires an analysis of “whether the work, 
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific 
value.” In doing so, courts would strike a more appropriate balance 
between prosecutors’ interests and defendants’ First Amendment rights. 
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INTRODUCTION 
After a 2012 scuffle with law enforcement that ultimately led to their 
arrests, Jamal Knox and Rashee Beasley wrote and recorded a rap song 
titled “Fuck the Police.”1 The video, uploaded to YouTube, features the 
pair “looking into the camera and motioning as if firing weapons.”2 The 
lyrics include “descriptions of killing police informants and police 
officers.”3 The lyrics specifically refer to Officer Kosko and Detective 
Zeltner, the law enforcement agents involved in the 2012 incident.4 The 
lyrics5 suggest that the artists know when Kosko and Zeltner’s shifts are 
over and that the crimes noted in the song might occur where the officers 
sleep.6 Further, the rap mentions Richard Poplawski, who had previously 
killed three police officers in Philadelphia.7 In the background of the 
song, both police sirens and gunfire can be heard.8 The pair were charged 
with two counts of terroristic threats and witness intimidation.9 
“Fuck the Police” was the sole basis for the witness intimidation and 
terroristic threats charges.10 The full lyrics of the rap were reported in the 
court’s decision; however, a sample edited for length is provided here: 
[Chorus:] If y’all want beef we can beef/I got artillery to 
shake the mother fuckin’ streets/If y’all want beef we can 
beef/I got artillery to shake the mother fuckin’ streets. 
. . .  
[Verse 1:] This first verse is for Officer Zeltner and all you 
fed force bitches/And Mr. Kosko, you can suck my dick you 
keep on knocking my riches/You want beef, well cracker I’m 
wit it, that whole department can get it/All these soldiers in 
my committee gonna fuck over you bitches/Fuck the, fuck 
the police, bitch, I said it loud. 
 
 1. Commonwealth v. Knox, 190 A.3d 1146, 1148–49 (Pa. 2018).  
 2. Id. at 1149. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 1149–50. 
 6. Id. at 1149. 
 7. Id. at 1149–50. 
 8. Id. at 1149. 
 9. Id. at 1150–51. 
 10. Id. at 1151. 
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The fuckin’ city can’t stop me/Y’all gonna need Jesus to 
bring me down/ And he ain’t fuckin’ wit you dirty devils/We 
makin’ prank calls, as soon as you bitches come we bustin’ 
heavy metal. 
So now they gonna chase me through these streets/And I’ma 
jam this rusty knife all in his guts and chop his feet/You 
taking money away from Beaz and all my shit away from 
me/Well your shift over at three and I'm gonna fuck up 
where you sleep. 
. . .  
[Verse 2:] I ain’t really a rapper dog, but I spit wit the best/I 
ain’t carry no 38 dog, I spit with a tec/That like fifty shots 
nigga, that’s enough to hit one cop on 50 blocks nigga/I said 
fuck the cops nigga/They got me sittin’ in a cell, watchin’ 
my life just pass me, but I ain’t wit that shit/Like Poplawski 
I’m strapped nasty. 
. . .  
[Verse 3:] They tunin’ in, well Mr. Fed, if you can hear me 
bitch/Go tell your daddy that we’re boomin’ bricks/And 
them informants that you got, gonna be layin’ in the box/And 
I know exactly who workin’, and I’m gonna kill him wit a 
Glock/Quote that. 
Cause when you find that pussy layin’ in the street/Look at 
the shells and put my shit on repeat, and that’s on Jesus’ 
blood/Let’s kill these cops cuz they don’t do us no 
good/Pullin’ your Glock out cause I live in the hood/You 
dirty bitches, bitch!11 
With this evidence in mind, the court set out to find whether criminal 
liability could be based on rap lyrics containing threatening verses to law 
enforcement officers.12  
Knox argued that the lyrics were protected by the First Amendment13 
and that any conviction based on his speech would be a violation of 
constitutional rights.14 The lyrics,15 Knox contended, were “merely 
artistic in nature” and “never meant to be interpreted literally.”16 Further, 
Knox “consider[ed] himself a poet, musician, and entertainer. Rap music 
 
 11. Id. at 1149–50. 
 12. Id. at 1148. 
 13. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech . . . .”). 
 14. Knox, 190 A.3d at 1151.  
 15. See id. at 1148–50 and accompanying text. 
 16. Id. at 1153. 
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serve[d] as his vehicle for self-expression, self-realization, economic 
gain, inspiring pride and respect from . . . peers, and [for] speaking on 
public issues including police violence, on behalf of himself and 
others . . . .”17 
In Knox, the court set out to determine “whether the song 
communicated a ‘true threat’ falling outside First Amendment 
protections.”18 Holding that the lyrics constituted a “true threat directed 
to the victims,” the court rejected the First Amendment claim and found 
Knox and Beasley guilty.19 The Supreme Court denied certiorari.20 
The Supreme Court rarely takes true threats cases, and when it does, 
decisions are often narrow.21 Scholars have criticized the Court for taking 
a minimalistic approach to the issue.22 Professors Clay Calvert and 
Matthew Bunker attribute constitutional avoidance, judicial minimalism, 
and partisanship as factors that have “thwarted the advancement and 
coherence of First Amendment doctrine, if not tossed it into greater 
confusion” since 2011.23  
This lack of clarity has had especially severe consequences in the 
context of rap music.24 However, it is naïve to believe the sole issue in 
the prosecution of rap lyrics are the words themselves; rap is often used 
as a proxy for Blackness in the courts.25 In an amicus brief submitted in 
Knox by rap music scholar Erik Nielson,26 rap artist Michael Render 
 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 1149. 
 19. See id. at 1151 (quoting Commonwealth v. Knox, Nos. 201206621, 201303870, 
201304264, slip op. at 19–20 (C.P. Allegheny Aug. 11, 2015). 
 20. Knox v. Pennsylvania, 139 S. Ct. 1547 (2019). 
 21. See Clay Calvert & Matthew D. Bunker, Fissures, Fractures & Doctrinal Drifts: Paying 
the Price in First Amendment Jurisprudence for a Half Decade of Avoidance, Minimalism & 
Partisanship, 24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 943, 954 n.20 (2016) (citing Jan Komárek, Reasoning 
with Previous Decisions: Beyond the Doctrine of Precedent, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 149, 164 (2013)) 
(observing that prior to Elonis, “the Court had not squarely addressed a true threats case in more 
than a decade”). 
 22. See id. at 951 nn.58–59, 951–52 n.60 (citing Dan M. Kahan, Foreword: Neutral 
Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 
1, 42 (2011); A.E. Dick Howard, Essay, Out of Infancy: The Roberts Court at Seven, 98 VA. L. 
REV. IN BRIEF 76, 84 (2012)). 
 23. Calvert & Bunker, supra note 21, at 951–52. 
 24. See infra note 28, at 22. 
 25. See id. at 2–3. 
 26. Erik Nielson is Associate Professor of Liberal Arts at the University of Richmond, 
where his research and teaching focus on hip hop culture and African American literature. He has 
published widely on African American music and poetry, with a particular emphasis on rap music, 
and has served as an expert witness or consultant in dozens of criminal cases involving rap music 
as evidence. Brief for Michael Render (“Killer Mike”), Erik Nielson et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner at 1, Knox v. Pennsylvania, 139 S. Ct. 1547 (2019) (No. 18-949). 
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(“Killer Mike”),27 and other academic and industry leaders, amici argued 
that “rap music has been the subject of unique scrutiny in determining 
when speech constitutes a true threat of violence and thus falls outside 
the ambit of First Amendment protection, in part because of its close 
association with the [B]lack men who historically have created it.”28 
Attorney David Morrow further criticized the court’s decision in Knox, 
noting that it “demonstrates a complete lack of understanding” about the 
rap genre.29 “The idea that someone could receive between two and six 
years in prison for rap is not just an injustice,” Morrow wrote, “[i]t is 
objectively wrong.”30  
Over time, rap music became more than artistic expression and artists 
began addressing social and political issues, bolstering the argument it 
should be protected under the First Amendment.31 As highlighted in the 
Nielson/Render amicus brief, “[r]appers used their platform to raise 
awareness about the problems facing urban America, and they became 
more comfortable challenging public figures and institutions that 
appeared uninterested in, or downright hostile to, America’s most 
vulnerable citizens.”32 In the 1980s, rap groups started using their power 
to take on the country’s most powerful and targeted issues, ranging from 
inequality and inner-city drug use to racism and police brutality.33 
While lyrics from rap and hip hop have been prosecuted under a 
number of different offenses—including obscenity,34 incitement to 
violence,35 and others36—this Article aims to address prosecution under 
the true threats carveout37 from the First Amendment. This Article 
especially takes aim at the often-overlooked factor that race plays in the 
prosecution of rap lyrics by applying a critical race theory lens.38 
First, Part I looks at the progression of true threats jurisprudence 
through three major cases.39 Next, Part II provides a historical primer on 
the barriers placed on Black Americans’ free speech rights, a struggle that 
 
 27. Michael Render (“Killer Mike”) is a Grammy-award winning rapper, community 
activist, and highly regarded author and public speaker who lectures on a wide range of issues, 
particularly those related to race, social inequality, and police brutality. His father was an Atlanta 
police officer. Id. 
 28. Id. at 2–3. 
 29. David Morrow, Freedom to Rap, 23 TYL 3, 3 (2019).  
 30. Id. 
 31. Brief in support for the Petitioner, supra note 26. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id.  
 34. Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578, 582 (S.D. Fla. 1990). 
 35. See Davidson v. Time Warner, Inc., No. Civ. A. V–94–006, 1997 WL 405907, at *1 
(S.D. Tx. Mar. 31, 1997).  
 36. Bell v. Itawamba Cnty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 387–88 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 37. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969).  
 38. See infra Part III. 
 39. See infra Part I. 
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continues today.40 Then, Part III examines how rap has become a proxy 
for Blackness and the effect that has had on stifling constitutional 
protections.41 Part IV examines popular free speech theories that would 
provide rationale for protecting the type of speech implicated in Knox.42 
Finally, this Article concludes by suggesting a possible path forward to 
protect rap artists’ speech under the First Amendment.43 
I.  PROSECUTION UNDER STATE AND FEDERAL THREATS STATUTES 
This Part considers three cases that collectively trace the evolution of 
the true threats doctrine, from its initial carveout from First Amendment 
protection to its more recent application to rap music cases.44 The theme 
drawn from true threats jurisprudence shows that the Court’s reluctance 
to address the First Amendment in its rare recent decisions has left lower 
courts without exact rules to apply when considering charges based on 
lyrics.45 Additionally, the muddled tests currently in use are not adequate 
for determining rap lyrics constitute true threats because courts and juries 
often lack the cultural context to fully understand the speech. 
A.  Watts v. United States46 
The true threats doctrine was established in the 1969 landmark case 
Watts v. United States.47 Watts, an 18-year-old rally attendee, was 
discussing police brutality when an older attendee suggested that the 
young people present should seek more education before voicing their 
opinions.48 Watts responded: 
They always holler at us to get an education. And now I have 
already received my draft classification as 1-A and I have 
got to report for my physical this Monday coming. I am not 
going. If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want 
to get in my sights is L.B.J.49 
After which, Watts was arrested and charged under a 1917 statute 
prohibiting any person from “knowingly and willfully . . . [making] any 
threat to take the life of or to inflict bodily harm upon the President of the 
United States . . . .”50 
 
 40. See infra Part II. 
 41. See infra Part III. 
 42. See infra Part IV. 
 43. See infra Part V. 
 44. See infra Part I, Sections A–C. 
 45. See Calvert & Bunker, supra note 21, at 944 & 951–52. 
 46. 394 U.S. 705 (1969). 
 47. Watts, 394 U.S. at 705. 
 48. Id. at 705–06. 
 49. Id. at 706. 
 50. Id. at 705–06 (alteration in original). 
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A jury upheld Watts’ conviction, and the United States Court of 
Appeals of the District of Columbia affirmed the judgment.51 Upon 
review, the Supreme Court found the statute constitutional on its face.52 
However, it noted the need to distinguish criminal speech from that which 
is constitutionally protected under the First Amendment.53 The Court 
ultimately held that Watts’ speech, which was political in nature, did not 
rise to the level of true threat prohibited by the statute.54  
In its decision, the Supreme Court built on its opinion from five years 
prior in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,55 opining that laws concerning 
speech must be weighed “against the background of a profound national 
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be 
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include 
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on public 
officials.”56 Key to Watts’ success was the context in which he spoke.57 
The Court noted that as Watts argued, his statement was nothing more 
than “a kind of very crude offensive method of stating a political 
opposition to the President,”58 and given the conditional nature of Watts’ 
proclamation and the audience’s reaction, little room was left for an 
alternative interpretation.59 
Scholars have criticized Watts for its failure to define true threats.60 
As Professor Frederick Schauer astutely notes, Watts “provides virtually 
no information on just what a threat is other than what Watts said was not 
one.”61 Instead, true threats jurisprudence has largely evolved in the 
circuit courts, which have adopted various tests. Professor Jessica Miles 
explains that “[u]nder the objective test, the fact finder asks if a 
reasonable listener, or, in some jurisdictions, a reasonable speaker or 
reasonable person, would find the communication at issue to be 
threatening.”62  
Complicating matters further, Professor Jennifer Rothman observes 
that many circuit courts “have allowed for the admission of the alleged 
 
 51. Id. at 706. 
 52. Id. at 707. 
 53. Id.  
 54. Id. at 708. 
 55. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 56. Watts, 394 U.S. at 708 (quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270). 
 57. Id. at 708 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Clay Calvert, Emma Morehart & Sara Papdelias, Rap Music and the True Threats 
Quagmire: When Does One Man’s Lyric Become Another’s Crime, 38 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 7 
(2014). 
 61. Frederick Schauer, Intentions, Conventions, and the First Amendment: The Case of 
Cross-Burning, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 197, 211 (2003). 
 62. Jessica Miles, Straight Outta SCOTUS: Domestic Violence, True Threats, and Free 
Speech, 74 U. MIAMI L. REV. 711, 716 (2020).  
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victim’s reaction as evidence of how a reasonable person would interpret 
the statement.”63 This subjective audience-reaction test is the third factor 
in the ill-defined federal true threats jurisprudence. It should be noted that 
the Supreme Court has yet to weigh in on the validity of the reasonable-
speaker, reasonable-listener, or audience-reaction tests.64 As described in 
the introduction, this uncertainty has left a fog over true threats 
jurisprudence.65 
B.  Elonis v. United States66 
The Supreme Court took up its first and only true threats case 
involving song lyrics in 2014.67 Anthony Elonis took to Facebook posting 
“self-styled rap lyrics containing graphically violent language and 
imagery concerning his wife, co-workers, a kindergarten class, and state 
and federal law enforcement.”68 In the posts, Elonis often included 
several disclaimers noting that the lyrics were not intended to be taken as 
truth and that he believed he was exercising his First Amendment rights.69 
However, many who saw the posts considered them threatening.70 Elonis’ 
boss ultimately fired him for threatening a co-worker, and his wife was 
granted a protection order.71 
Elonis argued that his speech was protected by the First Amendment 
as “constitutionally protected works of art.”72 Similar to the arguments 
presented in Knox,73 Elonis contended his speech was similar to that of 
rappers and singers performing shows or releasing recorded music.74 In 
his brief, he included a lengthy excerpt with the lyrics of a famous rapper 
who rapped about killing his ex-wife.75 Elonis hoped to juxtapose his 
expression with other popular art and thereby enjoy the same First 
Amendment protections.76 
However, the Court narrowly decided the case on the mens rea issue 
and therefore avoided addressing the First Amendment arguments.77 
 
 63. Jennifer E. Rothman, Freedom of Speech and True Threats, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
283, 288 (2001). 
 64. Id. 
 65. See supra notes 19–21. 
 66. 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015).  
 67. Id.  
 68. Id. at 2002. 
 69. Id. at 2005–06. 
 70. See id. at 2006 (noting Elonis’s wife, inter alia, felt “extremely afraid for [her] life”). 
 71. Id. at 2005–06. 
 72. Id. at 2016 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 73. Commonwealth v. Knox, 190 A.3d 1146, 1148 (Pa. 2018), cert. denied sub nom. Knox 
v. Pennsylvania, 139 S. Ct. 1547 (2019). 
 74. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2016 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 75. Id.  
 76. See id.  
 77. Id. at 2012. 
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Scholars have criticized the case for failing to clarify the constitutional 
issue of when speech falls into unprotected territory under the true threats 
carveout of the First Amendment.78 Further, the Court was given the 
opportunity to address true threats made in the context of the Internet and 
social media, another opportunity on which it punted.79 
Despite avoiding the constitutional issue, Elonis does represent a 
departure from the traditional rap-music based prosecution.80 Here, the 
Court’s holding on the mens rea issue established that the prosecution 
must prove that a defendant intended to actually carry out any alleged 
threats.81 Professor Donald Tibbs praises this development as “the 
proposition that prosecuting hip-hop now requires more than just putting 
a Black face to the music and claiming that hip-hop lyrics tell the entire 
truth.”82  
However, other scholars have noted that deciphering artists’ intent has 
not been a straightforward endeavor.83 Rap music often depicts violence, 
especially gang violence, although such depictions are often 
exaggerations.84 As one scholar, Erin Lutes explains, “[i]n spite of the 
creative license that many rappers take when crafting their songs, 
scholars have noted that the legal system has increasingly used rap lyrics 
as evidence as if the words were truthful and autobiographical.”85 Lutes 
highlights that this sort of interpretation raises particular concerns “in the 
context of criminal trials because it allows prosecutors to prove various 
elements of crime by circumstantial evidence that was crafted to 
glamorize either fictionalized or grossly exaggerated depictions of 
badness—often of the same type of criminal behaviors for which a 
particular defendant may be on trial.”86 
Likewise, Professors Clay Calvert and Matthew Bunker write that the 
true threats doctrine places a tremendous burden on speakers to clarify 
their messages.87 In the context of rap music, the pair explain that “the 
 
 78. See Calvert & Bunker, supra note 21, at 943–44, 946. 
 79. See id. at 944. 
 80. See Donald F. Tibbs & Shelly Chauncey, From Slavery to Hip-Hop: Punishing Black 
Speech and What’s “Unconstitutional” About Prosecuting Young Black Men Through Art, 52 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 33, 42 (2016). 
 81. Id.  
 82. Id. 
 83. See Erin Lutes, James Purdon & Henry F. Fradella, When Music Takes the Stand: A 
Content Analysis of How Courts Use and Misuse Rap Lyrics in Criminal Cases, 46 AM. J. CRIM. 
L. 77, 84 (2019) (describing “[d]eciphering such intent from song lyrics” as a “precarious 
undertaking”).  
 84. Id. at 84–85. 
 85. Id. at 85 (internal quotations omitted). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Clay Calvert & Matthew D. Bunker, Know Your Audience: Risky Speech at the 
Intersection of Meaning and Value in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 35 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 
141, 201 (2014). 
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messages are conveyed in an artistic genre of music that is heavily 
stigmatized and that features narrative conventions that might not be 
understood by a reasonable jury serving as a surrogate for a reasonable 
person.”88 In other words, context is key in determining true threats, and 
most courts and juries do not have the requisite familiarity with rap music 
to understand the context. With this in mind, Professors Calvert and 
Bunker suggest that a reasonable person probably should not take 
Elonis’s lyrics as literal.89  
C.  People v. Oduwole90 
In 2011, Olutosin Oduwole was charged with “the intent to commit 
the offense of making a terrorist threat” pursuant to Illinois state law.91 
The basis for the charges was a piece of paper with the handwritten 
words: 
I Lead She a follower, I’m Single and I’m not wit her, but 
she gott a throat deeper than a Sword Swallower/glock to the 
head of  
. . . 
SEND 2 to . . . paypal account if this account doesn’t reach 
$50,000 in the next 7 days then a murderous rampage similar 
to the VT shooting will occur at another prestigious highly 
populated university. THIS IS NOT A JOKE!92  
The note was found in Oduwole’s unattended vehicle before it was 
towed from the Southern Illinois University—Edwardsville campus.93 
The officer who found the paper slightly protruding from the center 
console acknowledged that a person outside of the vehicle would not be 
able to read the note.94  
Later that day, a warrant was served on Oduwole’s on-campus 
apartment.95 Among other things, police seized a gun, ammunition, and 
nearly 2,000 pages of writings.96 The officer who reviewed the writings 
 
 88. Id. at 202. 
 89. Id. at 204. 
 90. 985 N.E.2d, 316 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013). 
 91. Id. at 318. 
 92. Id. 318, 320. The State and Oduwole agreed to the facts that “Seung-Hui Cho, a full-
time student, armed with a 9-millimeter. Glock and a .22-caliber Walther pistol, shot and killed 
32 people, students and faculty, on the campus of Virginia Tech, and then killed himself.” Id. at 
318. The top lines were written in black ink and the lines at the bottom were written in blue ink. 
Id. at 320. 
 93. Id. at 320. 
 94. Id. at 320–21. 
 95. Id. at 321.  
 96. Id. 
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testified that “a large percentage of the notebook entries appeared to be 
rap lyrics and writings related to the defendant’s aspiring rap career” and 
that “some of the same symbols and words that were present on the paper 
seized from the defendant’s vehicle were also present in the notebooks.”97  
During cross-examination, one of the officers involved in the case 
acknowledged that there was no evidence that Oduwole was going to 
communicate the contents of the paper to anyone.98 However, the officer 
testified that he regarded the lines as a threat to the college community.99 
The officer stated that “he could not possibly consider” the words 
Oduwole had written “to represent creative writing, given that the 
Virginia Tech incident occurred three months prior and given his 
knowledge of [Oduwole’s] Internet purchase of four handguns.”100 The 
parties stipulated that Oduwole had opened a PayPal account under an 
alias two months before the note was seized.101 
A promoter of rap music, including Oduwole’s, testified that some of 
Oduwole’s lyrics were violent and “that violent lyrics are common in the 
rap industry.”102 However, the promoter testified that Oduwole was not 
“a violent person,” but rather “a nice person.”103 Another individual, who 
was present at Oduwole’s apartment at the time of his arrest, testified that 
Oduwole “came up with the idea for the Virginia Tech rap lyrics while 
they watched an episode of ‘Law and Order.’”104 Finally, University of 
California Professor Dr. Charis Kubrin, an expert in the field of rap 
music, testified that the paper seized from Oduwole’s vehicle “constituted 
the formative stages of a rap song.”105 
A jury convicted Oduwole of attempting to make a terroristic threat.106 
However, on appeal, an Illinois appellate court partially reversed the 
judgment, finding that the state failed to meet its burden of proving that 
Oduwole had taken a “substantial step,” as required to prove an inchoate 
offense.107The court declined to address any other issues raised by 
Oduwole.108 
Professor Andrew Kerr used Oduwole’s lyrics to make the keen 
observation that artistic value of lyrics can be assessed “only when rapped 
 
 97. Id.  
 98. Id. at 322.  
 99. Id.  
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 322.  
 102. Id. at 323. 
 103. Id.  
 104. Id.  
 105. Id. at 328–29. 
 106. Id. at 316. 
 107. Id. at 324–26 
 108. Id. at 327. 
88 UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 31 
 
by a rapper.”109 He compared the Oduwole lyrics, which appear to be “a 
rough draft of some kind of personal poem or rap,” to the lyrics of a 
popular rap song, which as written, would make little sense to most 
readers.110 This assessment carries significance as artists increasingly 
attempt to invoke First Amendment protections for their lyrics based on 
the artistic nature of the speech. If the artistic value cannot be determined 
until the lyrics are performed by the artists, such is the appropriate context 
in which the lyrics should be presented at trial.  
In reviewing Oduwole and similar cases, criminologist Adam Dunbar 
found that prosecutors generally follow the same playbook in prosecuting 
rap lyrics.111 First, they “treat rap lyrics as literal, self-referential 
narratives that can be easily interpreted by the lay public.”112 Second, 
“[p]rosecutors reinforce the first-person narrative perspective by reading 
the lyrics at trial like a journal entry, without rhyme or music.”113 And 
finally, they “claim that the lyrics are simply a reflection of the rapper’s 
lifestyle.”114 Dunbar’s research indicates this problematic because the 
mere label of rap music induces negative evaluations, even when 
controlling for the actual lyrics.115 
Professors Charis Kubrin and Erik Nielson called Oduwole a “blatant 
criminalization of rap lyrics.”116 The scholars lambast the trial court’s 
opinion for its potential chilling effect on rappers.117 “Without the First 
Amendment protecting these artists,” they write, “it would not be 
surprising if [other artists] began following Oduwole by modifying their 
art to avoid prosecution.”118 Professors Kubrin and Nielson note that in 
the aftermath of this decision, freedom of speech now comes with a racial 
caveat.119 
This Part shows the unclear development the present-day true threats 
jurisprudence. The Supreme Court’s reluctance to further define the 
doctrine has left a series of piecemeal tests and questions of constitutional 
validity. Further, these tests lack the appropriate consideration of 
context—and all-too-important key in determining whether speech 
qualifies as a true threat, thus evading First Amendment protection. This 
failure to consider context is especially poignant in cases involving rap 
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lyrics, where juries typically lack the understanding necessary to make 
such determinations within the genre. The next Part focuses on the 
unequal history and development of free speech protections for Black 
people in the United States. 
II.  LEGAL ISSUES INVOLVING RACE AND THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
Throughout the United States’ history, Black Americans have not had 
access to the rights and privileges afforded to their white counterparts.120 
Enshrined in the Constitution is the Framers’ intent that enslaved people 
were second-class citizens.121 However, some seem disillusioned that the 
First Amendment transcends race—that somehow this law is unique 
among others in its ability to provide equal protection to people of 
color.122 How quickly some forget that when the First Amendment was 
ratified, many Black Americans were considered property.123 
A.  America’s Origin 
In the free speech context, unjust restrictions on Black rights trace 
back to America’s slave era.124 In response to conspiracies regarding 
slave rebellions, the Slave Codes were enacted to protect the social order 
by criminalizing Black speech and assembly and also preventing Black 
people from learning to read and write.125 Sometimes, the mere mention 
of revolt was all that was needed for prosecution.126 One such rumored 
rebellion in Charleston, South Carolina in the early 1820s led to the 
execution of thirty-five Black men and forty more exiled.127 
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B.  The Civil Rights Era 
During the late 1950s and early 1960s, various states attempted to shut 
down NAACP chapters on the basis of refusing to submit membership 
lists.128 This behavior was a direct infringement on the members’ right to 
freedom of association, which is covered under the First Amendment 
freedom of speech.129 The Supreme Court ultimately ruled this practice 
unconstitutional in the 1964 landmark decision in NAACP v. Alabama.130 
More recently, a report from the Department of Justice showed that 
the rights of Black people were infringed during the protests in Ferguson, 
Missouri.131 There, law enforcement officials arrested people for a 
number of constitutionally protected activities including “talking back to 
officers, recording public police activities, and lawfully protesting 
perceived injustices.”132 According to the report, “[Ferguson Police 
Department’s] suppression of speech reflects a police culture that relies 
on the exercise of police power—however unlawful—to stifle 
unwelcome criticism.”133 
III.  RAP MUSIC AS A PROXY FOR BLACKNESS 
As detailed in Part II, the United States has continually thwarted Black 
Americans’ First Amendment rights to free speech and free expression.134 
Part I shows the way this recurring issue has manifested in the 
prosecution of rap lyrics.135 While not all of the defendants in the rap 
music trials are Black,136 the artform’s origin and cultural connection 
with Black America cannot be overlooked when considering this issue. 
Viewing rap lyrics in their proper context is vital. The lyrics, while 
sometimes provocative, violent, and profane, do not actually 
communicate true threats.137 The judiciary has repeatedly ignored this 
nuanced truth.138 Other types of music, including country music, echo 
similar themes of violence—yet reactions have not included the 
prosecution of the artists.139 In the Nielson/Render amicus brief for Knox, 
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the authors note that “[r]esearch tells us that listeners unfamiliar with hip 
hop culture may have difficulty being reasonable when it comes to rap 
music because it often primes enduring stereotypes about the criminality 
of young Black men, its primary creators.”140 They add that “[i]n the 
criminal justice system, the results of this racial bias are evident in the 
disparate treatment that people of color face at virtually every phase of 
the criminal justice process.”141 
Social scientist Carrie Fried conducted a study asking participants to 
read lyrics and identify if they were from rap or country songs.142 The 
lyrics used in the study were actually from an American folk song.143 
However, when asked a series of opinion questions including “[t]his song 
promotes violence, riots, and civil unrest” and “[t]hey should ban such 
songs entirely,” the participants who labeled the lyrics as rap reported 
significantly more negative reactions than those who identified the folk 
song lyrics as country.144 
The study suggests that rap songs are significantly more likely to be 
perceived as dangerous and offensive.145 Fried posited that “[o]ne reason 
that rap music, in particular, receives negative reactions may be that it is 
seen as a predominantly Black form of music.”146 Further, Fried 
explained that “[r]ap music, because of its association with African 
American culture, is judged through the tainted lens of a Black stereotype 
which includes traits such as violence, hostility, and aggression.”147 
When coupled with the United States’ treatment of Black Americans, 
the evidence in this Part strongly suggests that the prosecution of rap 
lyrics is an unconstitutional restriction on free speech.148 As Knox and the 
cases in Part I illustrate, the judiciary has not been keen to acknowledge 
any racial connection in the rap lyrics cases.149 Such an acknowledgement 
would be a beneficial step in securing equal protection in these types of 
cases. 
IV.  FREE SPEECH THEORIES PROVIDE RATIONALES FOR 
PROTECTING LYRICS 
This Part looks at three popular free speech theories: democratic self-
governance, the safety-valve theory, and self-actualization. It is important 
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for free speech doctrine to be rooted in theory, and each of the theories 
provided offers an underlying basis for protecting rap and hip hop lyrics 
under the First Amendment.150 
A.  Democratic Self-Governance 
The values enshrined in the First Amendment freedom of speech are 
often promoted as a means to protecting the democratic self-governance 
in the United States.151 The best known advocate for the democratic self-
governance theory, Alexander Meiklejohn, valued speech primarily for 
its contribution to people’s ability to govern themselves.152 Above all, 
Meiklejohn emphasized the importance of informed voters.153 For him, 
the purpose of free speech “is to give every voting member of the body 
politic the fullest possible participation in the understanding of those 
problems with which the citizens of a self-governing society must 
deal.”154 Because of this belief, Meiklejohn believed that “no idea, no 
opinion, no doubt, no belief, no counter belief, no relevant information” 
should be kept from the public.155 As noted, rap and hip hop lyrics are 
frequently used to critique political and social issues, as artists seek to 
inform listeners about corruption and other injustices. Such expression 
fits squarely within the Meiklejohn’s desire for a well-informed 
electorate. 
B.  Safety-Valve Theory 
Related to democratic self-governance theory, the safety-valve theory 
promotes the freedom of expression as a way to produce gradual change 
in society.156 By allowing dissent, individuals can peacefully advocate for 
their ideas in a democratic way.157 As Professor Thomas Emerson wrote, 
stifling free speech would “leav[e] those suppressed either apathetic or 
desperate. It thus saps the vitality of the society or makes resort[ing] to 
force more likely.”158 Essentially, without free speech, critics would be 
driven underground where their ideas may eventually bottle up into 
violent reactions.159 The safety-valve theory suggests that rap and hip hop 
artists’ freedom of speech allows for healthy forms of expression, which 
otherwise could bottle up and result in dangerous, disruptive conduct.  
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C.  Self-Actualization 
Third and finally, the theory of self-actualization comes from the 
recognition that speech not only promotes societal values, but it also 
enriches the life of the speaker.160 As Professor Thomas Emerson posited, 
the right to freedom of speech “derives from the widely accepted premise 
of Western thought that the proper end of man is the realization of his 
character and potentialities as a human being.”161 Likewise, Professor 
Laurence Tribe considers freedom of speech a fundamental good, that is, 
“an end in itself, an expression of the sort of society we wish to become 
and the sort of persons we wish to be.”162 As rap and hip hop artists are 
permitted to freely express themselves, they are allowed to engage in a 
basic human right, and they are more fully able to participate in the 
human experience.   
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s reliance on judicial minimalism and 
constitutional avoidance has left a cloud of confusion around true threats 
jurisprudence.163 With the Court rejecting certiorari on recent cases like 
Knox,164 it is essentially endorsing the decisions made by the lower 
courts. However, the failure to address the First Amendment arguments 
regarding the higher protection due to artistic and political expression is 
an affront to constitutional rights.165 
Though ratified more than 200 years ago, the First Amendment’s 
guarantees to all Americans have been a false promise.166 Part II details 
instances from the inception of the United States to recent years in which 
Black Americans have been oppressed through the restriction of their free 
speech rights.167 While the United States has made progress in racial 
equality, the prosecution of rap lyrics merely serves as the next step in a 
pattern of unconstitutionally denying privileges guaranteed to all 
Americans. 
This Article argues that the primary reason rap and hip hop lyrics are 
not afforded the same First Amendment protection as other genres is 
because of their strong association with Black culture.168 Research shows 
that with that association comes negative stereotypes including “violence, 
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hostility, and aggression.”169 These negative associations are especially 
poignant when mostly white judges and juries are asked to make 
determinations about true threats statutes and their application to rap 
lyrics. 
Existing theories for protecting free speech bolster the argument that 
song lyrics, especially those with political messages, should fall within 
the protection of the First Amendment.170 One of the hallmarks of free 
speech theory posits that political expression should receive the utmost 
protection.171 Further, allowing such speech promotes social stability and 
reifies the natural right humans have to express themselves.172 
How then, should this problem be addressed? As with many other 
issues in First Amendment jurisprudence, the judiciary is particularly 
well-situated to address the issue.173 As more rap lyrics end up on trial, 
the Supreme Court should grant certiorari and provide meaningful First 
Amendment analysis to the issue, abandoning its practice of judicial 
minimalism and constitutional avoidance.174 Looking to other First 
Amendment doctrines would give the Court an opportunity to import 
safeguards that would allow the true threats carveout to stand without 
offending the rights of rap and hip hop artists. 
The third prong of the Miller test provides a potential path forward.175 
In Miller v. California, the Supreme Court established a test for 
determining obscene speech, another categorical exemption from free 
speech rights.176 The three-prong test first asks whether “‘the average 
person, applying contemporary community standards, would find that the 
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest.”177 Next, courts 
must consider “whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently 
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state 
law.”178 Finally, and relevant to the current analysis, the Miller test 
requires consideration of “whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks 
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”179 
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By importing the third prong of the Miller test180 to true threats 
analyses, an essential constitutional safeguard would be put in place for 
rap and hip hop artists. As music is inherently artistic and rap music is 
often political, this necessary protection would include much of the 
speech from the aforementioned cases.181 Without this protection as 
precedent, courts have repeatedly rejected artists’ legitimate First 
Amendment defenses, and presently, there is nothing to suggest that 
similar prosecution of rap and hip hop lyrics will not continue. Given the 
United States’ abysmal track record pertaining to the protection of 
minority’s rights, this measure is long overdue to ensure the equal 
protection of all Americans’ First Amendment rights. 
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